Most tools try to make as many browsers look identical as possible, and sites like look to see if your browser matches any they've seen previously. These sites wrongly detect Brave as identifiable because they are designed to measure a different form of fingerprinting protection than Brave uses. Why does or some other site say that I am fingerprintable? This approach is especially useful in fingerprinters that hash together a large number of semi-identifiers into a single identifier, since randomizing just one value 'poisons' the entire fingerprint.

Third party frames and script share the seed value of the top level, eTLD+1 domain. These randomization values are derived from a seed that changes per session, and per eTLD+1. In cases where we randomize API values, we attempt to make modifications that are imperceivable to humans, but distinguishing to computers / fingerprinters. In cases where we block, remove or modify API behavior, we attempt to return empty, or non-identifying values, that have the 'shape' of expected values, to minimize web compatibility issues. making Brave instances look different to websites each time). Although fingerprinting attacks will always be possible, it is worthwhile for us to make these attacks as slow / costly / difficult as possible.īrave includes two types of fingerprinting protections, (i) blocking, removing or modifying APIs, to make Brave instances look as similar as possible, and (ii) randomizing values from APIs, to prevent cross session and site linking (e.g. Broadly speaking, browser fingerprinting is the detection of browser and operating system features that differ between users for the purpose of covertly identifying users and tracking them across the web. Technical detailsīrave includes best-effort defense against browser fingerprinting. Fingerprinting Protection is a privacy feature that makes it harder for sites to track you while you browse.

Brave tracking